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Abstract 
In 2006, the Russian state sought to rein in non-governmental organizations by passing a law 
restricting their activities. This legislation drew considerable criticism at home and within the 
international community with regard to the development of civil society in Russia. In this 
paper, we assess the impact of the NGO law on organizations that have received relatively 
little attention in the literature: Russian health and educational NGOs. The data suggest that 
these NGOs have acquiesced to the demands of this legislation, which undermines their 
independence and is currently stalling the further development of Russia’s civil society. Our 
findings also illustrate that these legislative changes have not resulted in the predicted effects.  
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Introduction 
Following the collapse of Communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
development of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has been a subject of increasing 
academic attention (for recent NVSQ articles see Carmin & Jehlicka, 2010; Spencer, 2011). 
In order to ensure their lasting independence, former Warsaw Pact countries sought 
membership in the EU. The pressures associated with Europeanization (Warleigh, 2001) have 
generated legal arrangements that have facilitated the creation of a third sector akin that 
found in EU countries (Warleigh, 2001). Despite its emergence from a seemingly common 
base, the Russian Federation, which did not seek EU membership, has faced only limited 
Europeanization pressure. The evolution of legal arrangements governing NGOs has 
therefore differed. In this paper, we examine the impact of these legislative changes. 
In mid-2006, the Putin Administration enacted a Law “On Introducing Amendments 
into Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation,”1 (commonly known as the “NGO 
Law”), which amended the existing legislation regulating NGOs. Federal Law 18-FZ was 
intended to make NGOs more accountable and transparent. The fragmentation of civil society 
that occurred following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Crotty, 2006) had led to NGOs 
acting as fronts for commercial or criminal organizations (Robertson, 2009) and non-
governmental individuals (NGIs) whose sole purpose was to chase grant money (Henry, 
2006). It was hoped that by increasing transparency and financial control of NGOs would 
professionalized, capable of convincing domestic philanthropists to make donations 
(Robertson, 2009). 
As observed by Robertson (2009, p. 540), however, the state also wanted to keep 
NGOs, particularly those with foreign funding, on a “very tight rein.” Prompted by the role 
that international NGOs had played in the “Color Revolutions” in other former Soviet states 
(Chaulia, 2006), restricting the activities and scope of NGOs could preempt similar perceived 
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interference (Machleder, 2006). Further, as argued by Machleder (2006), the Kremlin 
perceived both domestic and overseas NGOs as tarnishing Russia’s international reputation in 
the areas of human rights and democracy. In addition the intervention of foreign NGOs in 
Russia’s process of public environmental evaluation was perceived as curtailing its economic 
development, (Digges, 2006). These perceptions provided powerful stimuli for the 2006 
NGO Law. 
The NGO law, which echoes the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Associations,2 placed an increased administrative burden on both domestic and foreign NGOs 
(Maxwell, 2006). Maxwell (2006) observes that the changes to various legislative acts1 
increased state scrutiny of the activities and membership of NGOs. Among other 
amendments, the following changes to the Federal Law on Public Associations § 38 are 
critical:  
Supervision over the observance of laws by (…) shall be exercised by the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (…). While exercising such control the said body shall have the 
right: 1) to request from the governing bodies of public associations their regulatory 
documents; 2) to send its representatives for participation in the events held (…); 3) 
to inspect once a year at most the compliance of (…) activities, in particular their 
spending monetary funds (…); 4) to obtain on demand information on the financial 
and economic activities (…). 
It is therefore not surprising that the 2006 legislation drew high-profile criticism from 
both the international community (Machleder, 2006) and representatives of domestic NGOs, 
particularly those based on rights (Alekseeva et al., 2005). In its assessment of the draft 
legislation submitted for parliamentary consideration, Human Rights Watch stated publicly 
that the Russian NGO movement would be condemned to evisceration if it became law 
(Dejevsky, 2005). The Heritage Foundation stated that the additional costs and administrative 
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burdens would effectively smother Russia’s third sector (Volk, 2006). An open letter signed 
by the leaders of leading human rights, environmental, and other NGOs operating in Russia 
was also sent to the government, condemning the potential impact and harmful effects of the 
law (Alekseeva et al., 2005). Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov attempted to refute these 
criticisms (Abdullaev, 2006), citing similarities between the Russian legislation and the NGO 
Laws in France, Finland, and Israel.3 Other scholars (e.g., Abdullaev, 2006) also countered 
this argument by stating that much would depend upon how the law was implemented. 
Although France and Finland might have similar NGO laws, these countries are governed by 
transparent and functioning democracies. The strict implementation of such legislation within 
a developing democracy could cut off fledgling shoots of civil society.  
Since the NGO Law took effect in April 2006, it has been subject to a number of 
amendments aimed at addressing some of the concerns that have been raised. Amendments 
passed in 2009 include the exemption of NGOs with no foreign donations from reporting 
their revenue as outlined in the Federal Law on Public Associations § 32:  
Non-profit organizations (…) that had not during a year received any property and 
monetary means from international or foreign organizations (…), in the event that the 
receipts of property and monetary means amounted up to three million rubles, shall 
submit to the authorized body (…) an application confirming their conformity to this 
item and [confirm] (…) the continuation of their activity (…). 
It was no longer possible to register group, on the grounds that a group would threaten 
the “national interests of the Russian Federation” (Federal Law on Non-Profit Organizations, 
§ 23.1). All other provisions remained in force, including powers to attend all NGO meetings, 
whether private or public. The law was amended again in July 2011, expanding the grounds 
upon which the government could conduct unscheduled audits of NGOs. This amendment 
was subsequently repealed in November 2011.  
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From one perspective, these amendments could be seen as the state loosening the 
“reins” (Robertson, 2009, p. 540) on Russian civil society. From another perspective, these 
amendments would change very little of the overarching aim of this legislation, which is to 
“license” (Robertson, 2009, p. 541) Russian civil society. Moreover, as noted by Yakovlev 
(2006, p. 1054), subjecting the law to frequent changes reflects a pattern of “excessive” 
regulation, characteristic of the Putin/Medvedev era (Crotty & Rodgers, 2012). By making 
the law a moving target, it would be difficult for NGOs to know whether they are in 
compliance.  
To date, several empirical assessments of the NGO Law have been conducted, based 
on survey data (Jakobson & Sanovich, 2010) and anecdotal evidence (Javeline & Lindemann-
Komarova, 2010). In 2007, a more detailed assessment of its impact found that few 
organizations had complied with the registration requirements and that rights-based 
organizations felt proportionately more affected by the legislative changes (ICNL, 2007). The 
report also highlights inconsistencies with regard to the implementation of the law across 
various regions (ICNL, 2007). To date, however, there is no extensive array of empirical, 
peer-reviewed work on the impact of the NGO Law. Further exploration of the day-to-day 
impact of the NGO Law on Russian NGOs is therefore warranted. In this paper, we aim to 
enhance our understanding of both the reaction of NGOs to the NGO Law and the impact of 
this legislation on their day-to-day activities, based on interviews with 80 Russian NGOs. 
Our findings offer detailed insight into the impact of the NGO Law, thus providing a starting 
point for others to examine the development of civil society in Russia since 2006, in light of 
the NGO Law. We precede the presentation of our findings with a definition of civil society.  
 
Defining Civil Society 
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The literature defines and conceptualizes civil society in a variety of ways, and 
definitions often depend upon the importance of basic societal institutions. The term “civil 
society” is often used interchangeably with such terms as “third sector” or “social 
movements.” Despite conceptual and historical differences, these concepts share several 
common characteristics, including being considered separate from the state (see Muukkonen, 
2009). For this reason, Muukkonen (2009) suggests that the interplay between political 
systems, economic orientation, family systems, and religious traditions is what shapes civil 
society. The civil society space consists of a variety of institutional forms, including groups, 
formal and informal networks, associations, or organizations (Mercer, 2002).  
The Russian Federal Law on Public Associations § 5 refers to these forms as 
“voluntary, self-governing, non-profit formations set-up by individuals who have united on 
the basis of the community interests to realize common goals (…).” In the literature – and for 
the analytical purposes of this paper – formally organized groups or organizations are usually 
referred to as NGOs (Mercer, 2002). Thus, following Gordenker and Weiss (1995, p. 360), 
we define NGOs as formal organizations that are “self-governing on the basis of their own 
constitutional arrangements. (…) They are separate from governments (…) and are not in the 
business of making or distributing profits.” Mercer (2002) observes that the term NGO is also 
widely used to characterize formal civil society groups in Russia and other contexts of 
democratization (Spencer, 2011). Thus NGOs are both politicized organizations, which often 
challenge and attempt to influence decision-making within state institutions (e.g. promoting 
human rights or environmental protection) and apolitical organizations, which engage 
primarily in the provision of services and/or the delivery of public goods (e.g. working in 
areas of health and education).  
In the context of the Russian Federation, Cook and Vinogradova (2006) distinguish 
six broad types of NGOs, based on behavioral characteristics. Most studies on Russian NGOs 
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distil these six definitions into three groups (see Henry, 2006). The first group can be 
characterized as successors of the state-controlled institutional arrangements that the Soviet 
regime used to manage the free time of individuals (Howard, 2002). NGOs within this group 
have been described as government affiliates or government organized non-governmental 
organizations (GONGOs, see Muukkonen, 2000, p. 73), which are “created by the state or 
government officials and have no leadership or constituency in society” (Cook & 
Vinogradova, 2006, p. 34). In the context of Russian Federation, Cook and Vinogradova 
(2006) refer to GONGOs as marionette organizations, as they serve to legitimize and support 
the state’s policy agenda, in addition to creating the image of an autonomous and functioning 
civil society. The second group consists of grass-roots organizations (Cook & Vinogradova, 
2006). These are often small, locally based organizations that have no paid staff (Mercer, 
2002) are leader-centric and generally of an apolitical nature (Henry, 2006). These groups 
also find it difficult to attract funding either at home or abroad (Henderson, 2002). The third 
group consists of professionalized organizations (Henry, 2006). These are often larger 
organizations that are able to maintain paid staff (Mercer, 2002) and that had previously been 
reliant on funding from the West (Sundstrom, 2005). To be consistent, we adopt these 
descriptors in this study. In order to provide some context, we now describe the development 
of Russian civil society prior to the implementation of the NGO Law. 
The Development of Russian Civil Society before 2006 
According to Cook (2007), the period since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been 
characterized by rapid democratization and the implementation of neo-liberally oriented 
welfare reforms that have eliminated the social safety net that guaranteed housing, education, 
and free healthcare (Rivkin-Fish, 1999; Thomson, 2002). Over time, the gap left by the 
retreat of the state from healthcare has been plugged (albeit inconsistently) by locally 
focused, donation-based groups. These groups were often reliant on sparse funding from 
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local authorities or from facilities that were financed by foreign organizations, (Rivkin-Fish, 
1999). Their focus was broad, ranging from social work (Thomson, 2002) to the societal 
integration of the disabled, in addition to such emerging problems as HIV/AIDS (Jakobson & 
Sanovich, 2010).  
Despite the emergence of these NGOs, Sundstrom and Henry (2006) describe the 
post-1991 development of Russian civil society as being in a “holding pattern,” with 
organizations struggling to overcome both the legacy of the Soviet past and difficulties 
arising from a transitional economic environment. A range of factors inhibited the 
development of NGOs in post-Soviet Russia, including a lack of enthusiasm in public 
participation (Petukhov, 2006; Rimskii, 2008) and the rejection of formalized volunteering 
(Howard, 2002). Further, Crotty (2006) argues that many social movements (e.g. the green 
and trade union movements) fragmented into individual organizations, due to the elimination 
of restrictions on expression and assembly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition, 
the continuing dominance of Soviet cultural values in political institutions (Hedlund, 2006) 
and social organizations (Spencer, 2011) meant that the majority of NGOs remained 
parochial and inward looking (Crotty, 2006; Mendelson & Gerber, 2007). 
The most detrimental factor for NGOs, however, was an absence of domestic funding 
sources. Sundstrom (2011) argues that the little domestic support that was available focused 
on isolated initiatives rather than on support for formally institutionalized organizations. This 
forced groups to rely on donations from overseas. Sundstrom (2005) assesses such foreign 
funding as ineffective in contributing to democratization, as it was often misdirected toward 
projects and programs with little public support. This combination of factors meant that the 
Russian civil society remained under-developed (Sundstrom & Henry, 2006), with limited 
public support or participation (Crotty, 2009). Recent studies (e.g. Jakobson and Sanovich, 
2010; Javeline and Lindemann-Komarova, 2010) provide a more positive assessment of 
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NGO activity and infrastructure (e.g. the development of domestic funding sources). 
Nevertheless, the extended literature overwhelmingly indicates that, prior to the passage of 
the NGO Law, most Russian NGOs had failed to realize their full potential, whether in terms 
of building civil society, holding the state accountable, or engaging the public (Crotty, 2009; 
Henry, 2006).  
The studies on Russian civil society that have informed these conclusions focus on the 
environmental movement (Crotty, 2006; Henry, 2006), the women’s rights movement 
(Sundstrom, 2005), trade unions (Kubicek, 2002), and the human rights movement 
(Mendelson & Gerber, 2007). This collective literature thus lacks a detailed assessment of the 
development of groups that advocate and are engaged in health and welfare causes. To 
address this omission, and to provide insight into the impact of the NGO Law on a relatively 
neglected section of Russia’s third sector, this paper focuses on the impact of the NGO Law 
on health and education NGOs (HENGOs). Have HENGOs resisted or acquiesced to the law? 
Given that the impact on funding and the registration requirements is likely to impose an 
additional burden on HENGOs, how and in what ways has the NGO law affected their day-
to-day activities? We explore these questions by analyzing interview data collected from 80 
HENGOs in three regions of the Russian Federation. Before presenting our findings, we 
outline the methodology of the research study. 
Methodology 
The research reported in this paper is based on a qualitative methodology that we 
applied in order to expose key insights into the impact of the NGO Law within individual 
organizations. We selected this methodology in order to provide a more detailed picture of 
specific organizational experiences than is provided by the evidence that has been published 
thus far (ICNL, 2007). In order to collect this data, we selected three cities (Perm, 
Yekaterinburg, and Samara) as sites for this study. Each of these cities is representative of a 
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typical industrialized provincial city located outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg. The 
region of Perm is dominated by extractive industries. Sverdlovsk (the region in which 
Yekaterinburg is situated) is a center for metallurgy, and Samara is a manufacturing hub. All 
three cities have significant defense sectors (Federal State Statistics Service, 2010), thus 
reflecting the industrialized nature of Russia’s provinces. Furthermore, more than 80% of the 
population in each of the three regions is ethnic Russian, and the areas are similar in terms 
gross regional product4 (Federal State Statistics Service, 2010). These three regions thus 
provide a sufficiently similar context for examining contrasts and similarities between these 
three regions (Miles & Huberman, 1999), while minimizing potential regional factors that 
could act as explanatory influences. 
According to Huberman and Miles (1999), inductive research designs should be 
applied for exploratory studies in which the territory under enquiry is excessively complex. 
Given the dynamic nature of Russia’s economic and social development, and given the lack 
of literature on the NGO Law and its impact, an inductive research design is appropriate to 
the purposes of this study. This approach also enables us to capture the respondents’ own 
interpretations (Eisenhardt, 1989), thereby facilitating the evaluation of the ways in which 
respondents portray the NGO Law.  
We drew upon the literature on civil society development in Russia (Sundstrom & 
Henry, 2006), aspects of the legislative changes, as well as their assessment in the literature 
(Maxwell, 2006) to construct a semi-structured interview protocol, which was translated into 
Russian for data collection. As with other Russian NGOs (see Spencer, 2011), the majority of 
HENGOs are small, with the majority of those participating in this study having six 
members. This means that both the leadership and membership were in constant interaction. 
The GONGOs and the professionalized HENGOs were larger and had less interaction 
between the membership and the leadership. Nevertheless, given the widespread use of 
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“democratic centralism” in Russian NGOs, in which the ideas of the leaders are automatically 
adopted by full member consent (Spencer, 2011, p. 1080), the leader’s response represents 
the most relevant opinion with regard to organizational decision-making (see also Jakobson 
& Sanovich, 2010). This study therefore focuses on interviews with leaders of HENGOs.  
On average, the interviews lasted 45 minutes, and they were conducted in Russian 
without an interpreter. To reduce self-reporting bias, the interview data were triangulated by 
consulting data, observational and artifacts collected by attending HENGO events (Miles & 
Huberman, 1999). The data-collection process focused on establishing the specific impact of 
the Law on the operations of NGOs. Data collection included reflective periods, during which 
the interview protocol was adjusted and amended in order to capture and probe any emerging 
issues.  
In order to recruit organizations, HENGOs were initially identified using web-based 
resources (http://www.nko-ural.ru/), as well as with assistance provided by three partner 
universities, which provided administrative support and facilitated access to NGOs in the 
educational sector. Participating HENGOs were purposefully selected (Siggelkow, 2007), 
based on their activities, objectives, and whether they considered themselves civic/social 
organizations (in Russian, obshchestvennyye organizatsii). This procedure initially generated 
contact details for approximately 35 organizations. To increase the number of participating 
organizations, local phone directories and snowballing techniques were used. The 
snowballing technique also helped to improve understanding regarding the interaction 
amongst HENGOs. In all, interviews were held with 80 organizations dispersed throughout 
the three regions.5  
For analytical purposes, all interviews were transcribed and translated into English 
onsite, calling upon the skills of native speakers wherever discrepancies arose. The interview 
material was coded inductively according to themes related to the manner in which the NGO 
13 
Law has affected HENGOs. As the interview transcripts were read and reread during the 
coding process, new codes emerged and existing codes were adjusted (Charmaz & Mitchell, 
2007). This process also established relationships between the various parts of the data (Miles 
& Huberman, 1999). In order to ensure coding reliability, the codes were discussed with field 
experts, who helped to reduce ambiguities. Throughout the analytic process, the interview 
data were crosschecked against observational notes and artifacts. The following discussion 
explores these issues, illustrating the key points with narratives from the interviews, as well 
as “illuminating examples” (de Vaus, 2001, p. 240). 
In order to ensure the anonymity of the organizations and the participants and the 
confidentiality of the data, the adopted coding system is used to refer to the data in the 
discussion that follows. For example, the code Org01Sam is used to refer to the first 
organization in Samara. Any organizational material collected that was not in the public 
domain is treated confidentially and thus included in this paper only in paraphrased form. The 
following section presents the empirical findings of this study.  
Findings 
Response to the NGO Law: Compliance or Resistance? 
Despite the criticism that the NGO Law has received both internationally (Dejevsky, 
2005; Machleder, 2006) and domestically (Alekseeva et al., 2005), our evidence suggests that 
compliance was widespread. Only 7% of the respondents reported that they had not complied 
with the law. A review of the data reveals that organizational categorization (e.g. 
GONGOs/marionettes, professionalized, or grass-roots organizations) or sector had only 
limited effects on compliance in all but five of the organizations. We explore this result in 
further detail below. 
Compliance: Access to State Funding 
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One result of the NGO Law is that access to foreign funding is now severely 
restricted. Combined with the absence of domestic philanthropy (Sundstrom, 2005), such 
restrictions often leave the state to assume the role of donor to Russia’s third sector. In 2010, 
the federal state distributed one billion rubles to only 604 of Russia’s 300,000 NGOs (Civic 
Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2010). With such fierce competition, eligibility for any 
funding is vital to the continued operations of an NGO (Javeline & Lindemann-Komarova, 
2010). It is thus not surprising that compliance appears to be aligned with such eligibility. 
Non-compliance meant that HENGOs would no longer be “granted the trust of the 
registration office which would allow us to continue” (Respondent 33, Org09Per) and that, 
“without the help of the government, you cannot achieve anything” (Respondent 16, 
Org17Sam). Respondent 65 (below) and many others in this study thus created “compliance” 
narratives highlighting the positive benefits for their organizations, rationalizing why they 
would chose to submit themselves to a law granting the state access to and control over their 
day-to-day activities. 
 
I think that, if the government wants to engage with the third sector, it needs to have 
an understanding of it. (…) Of course, nobody likes doing a statement of accounts; I 
do not like doing it. But if we want to have government funding, if we want to be equal 
partners [with the state], then we need to provide this information.  
Respondent 65, Org16Yek 
 
In a similar observation, Respondent 7 illustrates compliance as a sign that an 
organization is active. 
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I think that this law is very important because, in the third sector, there are many 
NGOs, but only few are actually active. [If you comply] everyone [including the state] 
will be able to know which organizations are active and which are not.  
Respondent 7, Org07Sam 
 
Survival is crucial; not “being registered” means that “you will not be able to exist” or 
be able to “participate in grants” (Respondent 4, Org04Sam). “Existence” (Respondent 66, 
Org17Yek) is the only method to access resources, interact with state authorities, and 
continue the work of an organization. Without being seen as legitimate, HENGOs cannot 
continue to function as organizations or to provide key services, including “social, sports or 
cultural events for the deaf” (Respondent 32, Org08Per), “local programs aimed a nurturing 
patriotism” (Respondent 61, Org12Yek) or “social-psychological and legal help for people 
with HIV/AIDS” (Respondent 46 Org21Per). For the majority of organizations in this study, 
therefore, refusal to comply was not an option. Compliance was assumed. 
 
The law has good intentions: monitoring of the work of NGOs so the state can direct 
financial support to their work. I also understand that the government has to check 
the work of the NGOs, so they do not do anything wrong. 
Respondent 8, Org08Sam 
 
I always say, it does not matter what rules are in place, as long as there are some. We 
are ready to play according to any rules. 
Respondent 47, Org22Per 
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This pragmatic approach comes at the cost of independence. Once an organization has 
received state funding, it is difficult to hold it accountable (Taylor, 2006). For the 
organizations in this group, however, this does not appear to be very important. Despite this 
situation, a recent CIVICUS survey (Jakobson et al., 2011) involving a wide range of civil 
society organizations reveals that these organizations have only a limited number of funding 
sources, with the sale of services and membership fees – and not state funding – providing 
the majority of organizational income (Jakobson et al., 2011). One caveat to this report, 
however, is that such income is used to maintain rather than to develop and increase the reach 
and impact of organizations (Jakobson et al., 2011). The continued development of these 
organizations is thus likely to require the ability to access state funding – and thus to comply 
with the NGO Law. In adopting this approach, therefore, compliant organizations are 
exchanging their democratization potential for legitimacy and eligibility for state resources 
(see also Jakobson & Sanovich, 2010). The only way to remain independent is to choose not 
to register. A small number of organizations in this study chose this route. We explore their 
motivations below.  
Non-Compliance: A Minority Response  
As noted above, 7% of the participating organizations did attempt to circumvent the 
NGO Law. Nevertheless, this group stopped short of outright protest or challenging the state 
and the NGO Law openly, instead choosing not to register with the state under the provisions 
specified in the NGO Law. The organizations that did not register consisted of five 
grassroots, leader-centric HENGOs (Org12Sam, Org22Sam, Org10Per, Org16Per, and 
Org09Yek), several of which had received foreign funding in the past. 
Respondents from these organizations characterized the NGO Law as “one reason 
why we left this sector” (Respondent 58, Org09Yek), because “everything became too 
organized; there are too many controlling structures” (Respondent 57, Org09Yek). They also 
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felt that the Law strained the ability of their organizations to conduct their activities: “[we] do 
not have the resources’ (Respondent 21, Org22Sam). They also considered the bureaucratic 
burden was too high and “entailed so much [work], so we decided not to register” 
(Respondent 21, Org22). More importantly, respondents in this group felt the Law saddled 
their organizations with an excess of paperwork, which disrupted their activities. 
 
I, like anyone else, understand that there is always something that can be criticized. 
There are always some formal aspects that they can use to disturb your activities. So 
you end up writing reports explaining yourself, and you do not get anything done. 
This is why I do not want to register.  
Respondent 12, Org12Sam 
 
Given the criticism of the NGO Law (Alekseeva et al., 2005; Dejevsky, 2005), the 
commentary from this group is more consistent with our expectations. The HENGOs in this 
group did not seem to share the pragmatic approach adopted by the majority of organizations 
that participated in this study. Although this result can be seen as a sign that some grassroots 
HENGOs decided not to comply, it also means that such organizations no longer officially 
exist. In addition to being ineligible for state funding, these organizations will also be 
overlooked by the state. This will further limit their ability to interact with the state and to 
influence it or hold it accountable, thus limiting their potential for democratization.  
 
The NGO Law: Impact on Day-to-Day Activities 
 Our second proposition explores the impact of the NGO Law on the day-to-day 
activities of HENGOs. A review of the data revealed that the sector of an NGO does not 
matter. Organizational categorization has the strongest effect on the constructed discourse, 
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with grassroots HENGOs referring to a wide spectrum of “negative impacts,” while 
professionalized HENGOs and GONGOs portray the impact as “positive.”  
  
Professionalized HENGOs and GONGOs 
Despite the criticisms of increased bureaucracy (Maxwell, 2006), the representatives 
of professionalized HENGOs and GONGOs did not portray the NGO Law as a burden. They 
reflected the government’s argument that the law was necessary in order to improve the 
transparency and professionalism of NGOs (Machleder, 2006; Maxwell, 2006). In discussing 
the registration requirements, two groups asserted that they had registered “without 
problems” (Respondent 15, Org16Sam). They further noted that their registration had “little 
impact on the activities and structures of our organization” (Respondent 65, Org16Yek) and 
that it been important in “bringing [their work] to paper” (Respondent 65, Org16Yek). In 
order to meet the requirements of the NGO Law, both groups stressed the need to have an 
“already very developed management system” (Respondent 64, Org15Yek) and to be 
“professionally organized” (Respondent 47, Org22Per), such that “filling in this 
[registration] document is not a problem” (Respondent 1, Org01Sam). This discourse 
indicated that professionalized HENGOs and GONGOs have tended to view compliance as 
helping them to become better, stronger, more efficient organizations. It has provided them 
with a way of demonstrating their professionalism and abilities. The respondents were thus 
also keen to contrast their professionalism with that of groups that were less organized. 
 
Today, the Law requires of [non-governmental] organizations the same that is 
required of commercial organizations, but the level of development – the level of the 
people that work in many organizations – is not always on that level. But we have no 
such problems. 
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Respondent 48, Org23Per 
 
In contrasting their approach to the Law, professionalized HENGOs and GONGOs 
highlighted another benefit of compliance. They perceived that the demands of the Law 
reduced the number of legitimate HENGOs. They stressed that the Law meant that “only 
active organizations [had] survive” (Respondent 61, Org12Yek) and that “others had been 
closed down” (Respondent 28, Org04Per). Thinning the field might be advantageous to 
individual HENGOs, which exist within an environment in which the competition for funding 
is fierce (Jakobson et al., 2011). A reduction in the number of NGOs is not good for the 
overall development of Russian civil society, however, as it weakens the base from which an 
active, functioning civil society sector could emerge. Moreover, in seeking to be one of the 
relatively few organizations to receive state funding, the professionalized HENGOs and 
GONGOs have apparently both complied with the NGO Law and allowed the state to 
determine their goals. 
 
Russia is a country in which the role of the government is important. If the 
government does not support this, then NGOs will have trouble doing something in 
this area. If the government says it needs to be done, only then will they work in this 
direction; otherwise nothing will happen. 
 Respondent 16, Org17Sam 
 
 Given the necessity of this tradeoff to their continued existence, the way in which 
HENGOs engage in the provision of services provision may not have changed, but the scope 
of services that they offer has now become subject to external interference.  
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It is perhaps not surprising that GONGOs, which emerged from within state 
structures, were willing to operate in this manner. The acquiescence of the professionalized 
HENGOs, however, is of greater relevance to this study. This development has allowed the 
state to annex a part of Russia’s third sector that was previously independent, thereby 
reducing the likelihood that such organizations can provide the leadership necessary to the 
emergence of a functioning civil society from within Russia’s current NGO community. This 
finding reflects the fears expressed by Dejevsky (2005) and Volk (2006), who asserted that 
the NGO Law would “eviscerate” or “smother” Russia’s emerging third sector. 
 Grassroots HENGOs 
 In contrast to the professionalized HENGOs and GONGOs, the grassroots 
organizations that we interviewed portrayed the stricter government supervision associated 
with the Law as a strain on their resources. The time required to complete the necessary 
paperwork was particularly problematic, as the Law “makes you submit all your protocols. 
They want so many documents that a year is not enough to get them all together” 
(Respondent 55, Org07Yek). Further, grassroots HENGOs noted that the audits following the 
submission of their annual statements were “very tough, [and] you need a lot of time” 
(Respondent 31, Org07Per) and that the requirements of these audits posed a distraction from 
the work of their organizations. 
 
In general, when they were introduced, these new rules gave us a headache. We are 
not able to keep an accountant on staff, but we had to hire one and take some of the 
money we use for projects to pay him. 
Respondent 24, Org13Sam 
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It takes a lot of time and takes you away from the focus of your work, and you have to 
do all the paperwork instead of helping our children.  
Respondent 70, Org21Yek 
 
 The respondents from grassroots HENGOs thus saw the Law as a drain on their time 
and resources, requiring them to hire staff members that they could not afford and to devote 
time that they would otherwise have spent advancing the aims of their organization on 
completing paperwork. These respondents also emphasized what they saw as the presumption 
of guilt underlying the NGO Law: “it is your responsibility to fill the reports correctly” 
(Respondent 55, Org07Yek) and, even “if they make a mistake, you have to prove that they 
were wrong” (Respondent 51, Org03Yek).  
 
You hand them [the reports] in and they find a small mistake, some inaccuracy, a 
spelling mistake or if you use the wrong word. They send the documents back to you 
in order to liquidate your organization. 
Respondent 61, Org12Yek 
 
These comments reflect the way in which grassroots HENGOs perceived the milieu 
of excessive regulation (Crotty & Rodgers, 2012) that had dominated the Putin/Medvedev 
era. By creating a legislative environment in which NGOs need to comply in order to ensure 
their existence, but in which compliance is difficult to achieve, the Law gives the state 
significant, yet unwritten power over the activities of NGOs. As explained by the 
representatives of grassroots HENGOs, the reporting requirements are “very tight now, which 
makes life difficult” (Respondent 53, Org05Yek), “so difficult, I was tearing my hair out” 
(Respondent 50, Org02Yek). Nevertheless, non-compliance was not an option. Like their 
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professionalized HENGO and GONGO counterparts, these organizations recognized that 
non-compliance would mean that their organizations would cease to exist (officially) and that 
they would be “out of business.”  
 
Of course, we have to be registered, because now everything is more structured. 
Without adhering to the official requirements, you will not be able to exist. If we have 
people coming to our courses, they want a certificate, so we have to be official so we 
can get paid.  
Respondent 66, Org17Yek 
 
As was the case with professionalized HENGOs and GONGOs, legitimacy played a 
large role in the acquiescence of grassroots organizations to this Law despite the obstacles it 
posed for the day-to-day operations of their organizations. This was the case, even though 
many grassroots HENGOs stated that they had received very little state funding or had little 
prospect of receiving any: “we receive very little funding” (Respondent 22, Org23Sam); “we 
hand in empty declarations, I mean I just put a zero everywhere” (Respondent 22, 
Org23Sam). Nevertheless, they needed to remain eligible for potential access to state or other 
domestic funding at some point in the future.  
We discuss the implications of this and the other findings in the following section. 
Conclusion 
Our findings reflect a strong relationship with the extended literature on civil society 
in Russia (Crotty, 2009; Henry, 2006; Jakobson & Sanovich, 2010; Spencer, 2011). Before 
presenting our conclusions, however, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this 
study. A larger sample, a different methodological approach, different sectors and regions 
may have generated different reactions to the NGO Law. Such contextual differences should 
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be addressed in future research. Our conclusions should thus not be applied to Russia as a 
whole. The importance of the findings reported in this paper lies in the fact that they provide 
insight into the impact of the NGO Law on NGOs, as well as on the prospects for the 
development of Russia’s civil society. We hope that this paper will provide a springboard for 
other researchers to examine the development of Russian civil society since 2006. 
Given criticism that the NGO Law has received both domestically and internationally, 
the analysis of the data presented in this paper may appear counterintuitive. Based on the 
objections by rights-based organizations (Dejevsky, 2005), we would expect that the majority 
of NGOs in this study would have either engaged in reluctant compliance or refused to 
comply (see ICNL, 2007). The results reveal the opposite, with only 7% of the organizations 
having engaged in active non-compliance and with some HENGOs even viewing the NGO 
Law in a positive way (in addition to their compliance). Conversely, our data contain no 
evidence of groups engaging in any direct challenge to the Law, whether through protest or 
through legal challenges.  
Respondents illustrated organizational compliance with the NGO Law as a function of 
survival and legitimacy. They were pragmatic about the restrictions imposed by the NGO 
Law, and they had been willing to exchange independence for the chance of survival. The 
pragmatic response of respondents also illustrates the adaptive nature of Russian NGOs 
(Jakobson & Sanovich, 2010). It remains to be seen whether the 2009 amendments will 
change the respondents’ assessment of the legislative environment.  
In an environment in which funding is limited, it is not surprising that HENGOs with 
a focus on the provision of services would seek to comply with the Law if compliance meant 
being eligible for state or other domestic funding that would enable the continuity of their 
work. At the same time, however, this also illustrates the ingenuity of the NGO Law. Since 
1991, Russian NGOs have struggled to access resources. The NGO Law has mobilized this 
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issue. In cooperation with the Civic Chamber, the state has replaced the previously scant 
funding sources as a major donor to Russia’s third sector (Richter, 2009). The organizational 
growth of many HENGOs depends upon legitimate to access state authorities and eligibility 
for state funding. 
In addition, by recognizing the characteristics of Russia’s underdeveloped civil 
society and by constructing a mechanism for “licensing” the existence of NGOs, the NGO 
Law has effectively allowed the state to annex parts of Russia’s civil society. Our conclusions 
thus reflect the argument proposed by Jakobson and Sanovich (2010, p. 294) that the state 
now governs the third sector, even though it also promotes the non-political activities of 
NGOs as “allies in solving social problems.”  
Our observations also suggest that both non-political and pro-state organizations have 
been gaining strength within Russia’s current political and legal environment (Robertson, 
2009). Civil society arrangements inspired by religious, “orthodox,” (Kharkhordin, 1998) or 
political traditions have favored arrangements in which the state has control over society 
(Hedlund, 2006). As argued by Hedlund (2006), the need to maintain control over a vast 
geographical space generated a patrimonial regime characterized by institutional 
arrangements aimed at ensuring the regime’s survival. This regime and its subsequent 
reiterations were built primarily upon the existence or portrayal of an outside threat to the 
territory, thus feeding a system of state bureaucracy that depended upon the ruler for its 
economic survival. Hedlund (2006) further asserts that state bureaucracy used various 
devices, including regulations (or, as noted by Yakovlev [2006], regular changes to the 
legislative framework) and religion or ideology (e.g., communist) to strengthen its power. 
The NGO Law and similar developments in the media (Simon, 2004) with regard to 
religious2 or commercial organizations (Yakovlev, 2006) under the Putin/Medvedev 
administration are a reflection of the persistence of such arrangements.6  
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As highlighted by our evidence, therefore, societal institutions that facilitate such a 
regime continue to exist, thus reiterating the argument made by Muukkonen (2009) that civil 
society is a function of basic societal institutions. Despite more than 20 years of transition, 
the civil society arrangements illustrated in this paper imply that a reconfiguration of these 
basic institutions will require additional time. Our study indicates that the legislative 
arrangements adopted in 2006 have apparently not been helpful in facilitating this process or 
in bringing order to this emerging sector. We therefore argue that, while the spirit of the 2006 
NGO Law remains unchallenged and unchanged, the character of Russia’s civil society will 
remain one that fails to challenge the state or to hold it accountable, and that this will 
continue to have implications for Russia’s democratic development. 
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Endnotes 
1 The 2006 NGO Law amended the legislation governing non-governmental organizations, 
including nonprofits (Federal Law on Non-Profit Organizations, 1996), public associations 
(Federal Law on Public Associations, 1995), religious organizations (Federal Law on 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, 1997), and charitable organizations 
(Federal Law on Charitable Activities and Organizations, 1995).  
2 The Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations (1997, amended 
2004) placed restrictions on the operations of foreign missionaries in Russia, narrowly 
defined the entities that could and could not be registered as religious organizations, and 
permitted the suppression of religious groups that could harm the “morality” or “health” of 
the Russian people. 
3 In France, NGOs are regulated by a law known as the 1901 Law (loi 1901; OSCE Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2012). In Finland, they are regulated by the 
Associations Act of 1990 and its subsequent amendments (PRH, 2002). Israel’s parliament is 
currently discussing amendments to existing NGO regulations in order to limit foreign 
funding to NGOs (Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 2012). 
4 In 2009, the GRP of Perm was 609.2 billion rubles, while that of Samara was 706.5 billion 
rubles and that of Sverdlovsk was 823.8 billion rubles. 
5 In all, 80 organizations participated in this study. Most were active in the areas of health or 
education. The majority of the organizations (49) were active in the health sector, 
encompassing everything from support for the disabled to drug rehabilitation or support 
services for HIV/AIDS. Some of the organizations (25) were focused primarily on providing 
educational activities for children. One organization was active in both areas. Five 
organizations were infrastructural NGOs, which focused on providing support to other 
HENGOs. 
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6 In June 2012, the newly re-elected President Putin replicated the spirit of the NGO Law in 
another legislative context by introducing changes to the law governing public protests and 
by significantly increasing fines for unofficial protests. Also in 2012, the Russian state passed 
additional legislation that classifies NGOs receiving foreign funding as foreign agents. 
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